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CObjectives: This study investigated whether general practitioners
(GPs) know patients’ preferences regarding a number of organizational
characteristics in general practice (i.e., waiting time on the telephone,
opening hours, waiting time to the appointment, distance to the gen-
eral practice, waiting time in the waiting room, consultation time, and
whether the GP or assisting personnel performs routine tasks) to ex-
amine whether there is a basis for improving the agency relationship at
an aggregate level. Data: A total of 698 respondents from the Danish
population and 969 GPs answered the questionnaire in May and Sep-
tember 2010. Methods: In a discrete choice experiment, GPs and pa-
ients made both forced and unforced choices, allowing us to explore
he congruence of preferences 1) when patients must choose a new GP
nd 2) when they can stay with their current GP. Results: Results show O
Uni
.
al So
oi:10.1016/j.jval.2012.01.002hat in the forced choice, preferences are seen to differ. In the unforced
hoice also, preferences differ—mainly because GPs overestimate their
wn importance to the patients. Rank orders, however, are similar for
oth GPs and patients. Conclusions: It is concluded that GPs do not
ave a precise knowledge of patients’ preferences. However, in the
nforced choice, GPs do know on which attributes to compete although
hey underestimate the necessity of competition. The overall conclu-
ion is that there is room for improving the agency relationship in the
rganization of general practice.
eywords: discrete choice experiment, general practice, organization,
rincipal-agent relationship.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Numerous researchers have investigated the field of agency the-
ory in primary care, and the originating literature within the field
of health economics often uses a conceptual approach to describe
the principal-agent relationship, where the general practitioner
(GP) acts as an agent for the patient, that is, the principal [1–3].
Asymmetric information, as when a patient is less well-informed
about appropriate treatments than the attending GP, typically ex-
ists in the agency relationship, in which the patient delegates de-
cision-making authority to the GP assuming that the GP makes the
best decisions. The perfect agent is one who chooses as the pa-
tients themselves would choose if only the patients possessed the
same information that the GP does [4,5]. Because other attributes
than health are included in the principal’s utility function, the
issue of agency is not limited to apply to health only [1,6,7], and
researchers are generally encouraged to elicit patients’ prefer-
ences for factors other than health outcomes because of the diffi-
culty of designing a utility generating system without knowing
what objectives it should be trying to meet [8].
Nonalignment of agents’ and principals’ preferences may arise
if the GPs do not know the patients’ preferences [1,5], in which
case the issue of asymmetric information is reversed and the bar-
* Address correspondence to: Line Bjørnskov Pedersen, Research
outhern Denmark, J.B. Winsløwsvej 9B, 5000 Odense C, Denmark
E-mail: lib@sam.sdu.dk.
098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, Internation
ublished by Elsevier Inc.rier to better agency may be the GPs’ lack of full information on
patients’ preferences for health-care service attributes. The issue
of possible nonalignment due to the GPs being less than perfectly
informed on patient preferences is the focus of this empirical ar-
ticle, in which a discrete choice experiment (DCE) is applied. The aim
is to elicit and compare patients’ preferences and the GPs’ percep-
tions of patient preferences for different organizational aspects in
primary care to investigate whether there is a basis for improving the
agency relationship in general practice. The analysis will compare
aggregate GP preferences with aggregate patient preferences, be-
cause matching of GPs and patients was not possible.
To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study that em-
pirically examines the agency relationship in a general practice
setting by using a DCE. The agency relationship has been investi-
gated empirically in a number of satisfaction studies, where 1)
GPs’ own preferences were compared with patients’ preferences,
for example, [9–11], and 2) GPs’ perceived preferences of patients
were compared with the patients’ preferences, for example, [12].
Three DCE studies have also compared patients’ preferences with
doctors’ perceived preferences of the patients [13–15]. None of
these were conducted in a general practice setting. The DCE has
the advantage over common satisfaction studies in that it enables
the researcher to systematically investigate the relative impor-
tance of the included topics of investigation by forcing respon-
t of Health Economics, Institute of Public Health, University of
ciety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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515V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 1 4 – 5 2 3dents to make trade-offs hereby providing information about the
importance of different aspects relative to each other. This study
adds to the knowledge of existing studies examining the agency
relationship in performing a comprehensive investigation of
whether and how preferences differ by using a number of different
approaches (tests for parameter equality, calculations of all possi-
ble combinations of marginal rates of substitution [MRS], reports
of rank orders, tests for differences in choice behavior across
choice sets, and tests for differences in scale), many of which have
not been applied previously within this area of investigation.
In the present study, aggregate preferences were compared in a
dual-response approach in which respondents were first asked to
make forced choices and hereafter allowed to opt out by choosing
the status quo. We investigated 1) whether GPs know which attri-
butes are more important to the patients when they are forced to
choose a new GP and 2) whether the GPs know the preferences and
loyalty of the patients when they have the option of staying with
their current GP. Finally, we seek to discuss how potential non-
alignment of preferences can be explained and how citizens’ pref-
erences can be taken into consideration in the organization of the
primary health-care sector.
Methods
Setting
As in many other countries, GPs in Denmark run private practices
and are reimbursed by the health-care authorities (Danish Re-
gions) in a mix of capitation and fee for service. The number of GPs
practicing in each region is agreed upon between the Danish Re-
gions and the Organisation of General Practitioners in Denmark
through annual negotiations. In Denmark there are about 3600 GPs
distributed relatively evenly across the country. In this way, the
Danish health system has succeeded in achieving relatively short
travel distances to GPs and reasonable equity in access to GP ser-
vices. However, the recruitment of doctors into general practices
has started to become more problematic and some regions are
facing difficulties when having to replace retiring GPs, especially
in rural areas of the country. The Danish population is free to reg-
ster with a GP of their own choice, subject to a maximum distance of
5 km (5 km in Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities) be-
ween their home and the practice. When the GP has 1600 patients on
ist, patient intake can cease, but the GP is free to accept up to 2700
atients on list. Hereafter access will be closed automatically to sus-
ain a certain level of quality in patient treatment. Because of the
egulation of location and number of GPs in general practice, and also
artly because of GP shortages, GPs are ensured solid market posi-
ions, which preclude perfect competition in the market. When per-
ect competition is absent, GPs may not have distinct incentives to
ather information on patients’ preferences and organize accord-
ngly to attract them to their practice. Therefore, the imperfect com-
etition in general practice further motivates the investigation of
hether GPs are aware of the preferences of the patients.
Survey design
Patients’ preferences and GPs’ perceptions of patient preferences
for different organizational characteristics, that is, waiting time on
the telephone, opening hours, waiting time to the appointment,
distance to the general practice, waiting time in the waiting room,
consultation time, and whether the GP or assisting personnel per-
forms routine tasks, were examined at an aggregate level in a DCE.
To ensure operable and policy-relevant results, the choice of attri-
butes was guided mainly by three criteria. First, an essential deci-
sion criterion for an attribute to be included was that it should be
expected to influence the patients’ choice of GP. Second, the GPs
should be able to influence attribute levels. Third, the attributes pshould be objective and not relate to intrinsic GP characteristics re-
lated to personality. The criteria entailed that personal GP character-
istics such as age and gender were excluded, as were practice type
and intangibles such as the GP’s ability to listen to the patient and
willingness to adhere to patients’ preferences. Distance was deemed
an attribute that the GP could influence by settling in a more local
practice setting rather than a larger shared practice. The attributes
and levels were chosen on the basis of examination of results from
other studies investigating patients’ preferences for the organization
of general practice (e.g., [11,16–22]), visits at different general prac-
tices, interviews with GPs, interviews with patients, and discussions
with the Organisation of General Practitioners in Denmark. Table 1
provides an overview of attributes, attribute levels, and the expected
effects of the attributes on preferences for choice of GP.
In the experimental design phase, a Bayesian efficient main-
effects design was created [23,24] by means of the software Ngene
provided by ChoiceMetrics (www.choice-metrics.com). Bayesian
efficient designs are found to be robust to misspecifications when
the sample is sufficiently large (n  250), and efficiency gains are
ossible. The gains are more significant when the attributes with a
riori expectations have a relatively large weight in the utility
unction, the prior information is of good quality, and the data-
enerating process is consistent with the specification chosen in
he design, for example, a multinomial or mixed logit model [23].
wo hundred Halton draws were used to approximate the proba-
ility density function, and a column-based swapping algorithm
as used to find the most efficient design of those available. The
ttributes waiting time on the telephone, opening hours, waiting
ime to the appointment, distance to the general practice, and
aiting time in the waiting room were assumed to be uniformly
istributed according to the hypotheses in Table 1. Consultation
ime and routine tasks were assumed to follow a normal distribu-
ion with a positive and a negative mean, respectively. Sixteen
hoice sets were created ensuring, sufficient degrees of freedom,
nd the design was blocked into four by minimizing the average
orrelation between the blocking column and the attribute col-
mns [25]. Patients and GPs were randomly allocated to the four
locks, and it was tested whether randomization was successful
n the variables age, gender, and geography by using Pearson’s
hi-squared tests (because the blocking variable was nominal)
26].
The patient questionnaire was initiated with a number of in-
roductory questions about the respondents’ use of and satisfac-
ion with their GP and questions about their GP’s typical waiting
imes, consultation length, opening hours, and so on. GPs were
sked questions about the organizational characteristics of their
ractice. Hereafter, the DCE was introduced and for each of the
our choice sets, respondents were first asked to make a forced
hoice followed by an unforced choice. This dual-response tech-
ique is argued to be a valuable approach, especially if there is a
ossibility of a large number of status quo choices [27], which was
xpected in this survey because of transaction costs associated
ith choosing a new GP and fear of the unknown. It is acknowl-
dged, however, that the unforced choice should always be chosen
f there is an option of opting out or choosing the status quo and if
he intention is to derive welfare measures [28–30]. In the present
ontext, both the forced and unforced choices represent realistic
cenarios. Individuals may be forced to choose a new GP if their
urrent GP relocates or retires or if they themselves move to a new
rea (this is especially pertinent in countries with scarcity of GPs,
.g., in Denmark, where approximately one third of all GPs are
lder than 60 years and close to retirement). At the same time,
ndividuals always have the option of choosing a new GP should
hey wish to do so. The dual-response approach allows us to in-
estigate 1) whether GPs know the preferences of the patients
hen status quo is not an option and 2) whether GPs know the
references and loyalty of the patients when patients have the
516 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 1 4 – 5 2 3opportunity to stay with their current GP. The unforced choice
reflects a situation in which GPs are to reflect on patients’ choices
among patients who are already on their list. In the forced choice,
the GPs are to predict patients’ choices in a situation in which all
GPs are unknown to them. Both scenarios represent the type of
competition that GPs in principle face continuously: maintaining
existing patients on their list as well as attracting new patients.
Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set as it was presented to
the patients and the GPs. Subsequent to the DCE, questions on the
participants’ personal characteristics were posed.
The patient questionnaire was tested in a cognitive interview
[31], which led to minor changes. Afterward, a Web-based pilot
study with 28 respondents (drawn as a convenience sample from
the Danish population) was conducted. While answering the ques-
tionnaire, the respondents were three times encouraged to com-
ment on the questionnaire and state if they felt something was
missing. Afterward, conditional logit (CL) analyses were con-
ducted to estimate preferences on the sample. These interviews
confirmed that all relevant attributes were included, because none
of the interviewees felt that important GP characteristics were
omitted. The pilot study led to minor changes. The most impor-
tant was a reduction in the number of choice sets from eight to
four. Many respondents stated that eight choice sets were too
many because they got confused, lost perspective, and could not
distinguish the choice sets from each other. The GP questionnaire
was tested in three cognitive interviews [31] with GPs from differ-
ent general practices. The cognitive interviews led to several ad-
justments related to the wording and options given in the ques-
tionnaire to make the questions realistic to the GPs and in
correspondence with the collective agreement. Afterward, a pilot
study with seven GPs was conducted, which led to minor changes.
Method of data collection
Paper-based questionnaires were forwarded to the GPs while a
Web-based survey was used for eliciting patients’ preferences.
Table 1 – Attributes, attribute levels, and hypotheses for bo
Attributes Description
Telephone Typical waiting time on the telephone
Opening hours Opening hours (besides normal opening h
Appointment Typical waiting time to the appointment (
nonacute problem)
Distance Distance to the general practice
Waiting room Typical waiting time in the waiting room
Consultation time Average time allocated to the consultation
Routine tasks Who performs routine tasks (e.g., blood sa
tests for allergies, vaccination)
GP, general practitioner.The interviewed GPs and the Organisation of General Practitionersin Denmark expressed preferences for having questionnaires sent
out by regular mail because this was more convenient to the GPs
and accorded with their usual working procedures. The Web-
based survey was chosen for the patients because 89% of the Dan-
ish population has Internet access in their own homes [32], and
many elderly people are computer literate (43% of the Danish pop-
ulation in the age group 65–89 years uses a computer every week
[33], indicating a fairly high literacy). Coverage error is therefore
not a major problem in Denmark, although the prevalence of a
panel effect cannot be excluded [34]. Problems with the use of
different sampling procedures when preferences are compared
are addressed in Nielsen [35]. Studies comparing results from
stated preference surveys using paper-based and Web-based sur-
veys have not found differences in stated preference results
[36,37].
A total of 698 respondents from the Danish population an-
swered the patient questionnaire, which was sent out in May 2010
as part of a larger Web-based survey. Respondents were recruited
from an Internet panel where members (18 years of age) received
an e-mail with a link to the questionnaire. The target sample
size was 1400 respondents (for all versions of the survey), and the
link was deactivated when the quota was met (the target sample
size was expected to be sufficient on the basis of the median S-
optimality estimate of 1077, which provides a lower bound esti-
mate for the necessary sample size to obtain significant parameter
estimates [38]). In total, 1435 respondents answered the question-
naire. Those respondents not included for the purpose of this
study (n 737) received a similar DCE in which a cost attribute was
also included. Respondents were randomly allocated to either the
DCE with inclusion of a cost attribute or the DCE without the in-
clusion of a cost attribute. Results comparing the estimates from
the two DCEs with and without the cost attribute are presented in
another article [39]. The representativeness of the 698 respon-
dents who received the part of the survey that is analyzed in the
present survey was tested with respect to age, gender, and geog-
Ps and patients.
Attribute levels (effects coding) Hypotheses
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a Same day 
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1 wk
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517V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 1 4 – 5 2 3[26]. In the following text, we refer to the random sample of Danish
citizens as general practice patients, because almost all citizens
will visit their GP at some point in time and 87% of all citizens visit
their GP at least once per annum [40].
The GPs received a paper-based questionnaire in September
010. The questionnaire was mailed to a simple random sample of
822 GPs corresponding to half of all GPs in Denmark. One re-
inder was sent out during the data collection process together
ith a copy of the questionnaire. Of the 1822 distributed question-
aires, 969 were returned, resulting in a response rate of 53%. The
epresentativeness of the GPs with respect to age, gender, and
eography was tested by using t tests for proportions on 95% con-
dence levels [26]. The 969 GPs serve more than 25% of the Danish
opulation. Because patient and GP data could not be matched,
owever, it was not possible to investigate which GPs serve which
atients, and possible nonalignment in preferences may arise be-
ause of estimation at an aggregate and unmatched level. This is
urther addressed in the “Discussion” section.
Modeling and strategy for data analyses
In the DCE respondents are asked to choose their preferred alter-
native from a set of hypothetical alternatives. It is assumed that
individuals choose the alternative that maximizes utility and that
individuals have well-behaved preferences [41]. According to ran-
dom utility theory [42], the true but unobservable utility for alter-
native j of individual i can be written as
UijVij(Xij,)ij (1)
where Vij represents the observable systematic component of util-
ity that is the explainable proportion of the variance in utility of
alternative j and ij is the nonexplainable proportion representing
the unobservable and random treated component. Assuming a lin-
Imagine that your GP has decided to close his/her p
between two other GPs, GP A and GP B. (Imagine t
patients have the possibility to choose between two o
Typical waiting time on the telephone 
Opening hours (besides from normal opening 
hours) 
Typical waiting time to the appointment (with a 
non acute problem) 
ecitcarplarenegehtotecnatsiD
Typical waiting time in the waiting room 
Average time allocated to the consultation 
Who performs routine tasks (e.g. blood samples, 
tests for allergies, vaccination) 
Which GP would you prefer?(Which GP do you thin
Now imagine that your GP has decided not to close 
opportunity to choose between the two GPs A and B
(Now imagine that you do not have to close your pra
opportunity to choose between the two GPs A and B
would prefer now? 
My current GP (Myself)    
Fig. 1 – Example of a discrete choice question as it wear additive utility function, the observable component for individuali for alternative j becomes Vij  Xij, where Xij  x1,x2, . . . ,x is a
ector of attributes [43].
Following the objective of the study, two research questions
were posed.
Research question 1: do GPs know the preferences of the
patients when status quo is not an option?
This was tested by investigating whether stated preferences differ
across GPs and patients at the aggregate level for the attributes
included in the forced choice DCE. First, the test of equal parame-
ters [44] was used to investigate parameter equality between the
two groups of respondents. Second, the rank orders of the attri-
butes for the two groups were compared and comparisons for all
possible combinations of MRS estimates were made for GPs and
patients (only MRS estimates with distance as denominator are
explicitly reported). Standard errors were estimated by using the
delta method [45]. Third, choice behavior of the GPs and patients
was investigated and compared by using Pearson’s chi-squared
test.
Research question 2: do GPs know the preferences and
loyalty of the patients when they have the option of staying
with their current GP?
This was tested by comparing stated preferences for GPs and pa-
tients in the unforced choice DCE. The tests were similar to those
used in research question 1. Status quo characteristics were as-
sumed to be equal across groups.
In addition, subgroup analyses were performed to test for
alignment across patients’ preferences and GPs’ perceptions of
these preferences for specific subgroups of GPs and patients, re-
e, and that you have the possibility to choose 
u have to close your practice, and that your 
GPs, GP A and GP B) 
GP A GP B 
15 minutes 1 minute 
pen in Saturdays No extended opening hours 
3 days 2 weeks 
sertemolik51sertemolik5
20 minutes 10 minutes 
5 minutes 30 minutes 
eneral practitioner Nurse 
r typical patient would prefer?) 
GP A GP B
r practice anyway and that you hereby have the 
our current GP. Which GP would you prefer now? 
anyway and that your patients hereby have the 
ou. Which GP do you think your typical patient 
GP A GP B
esented to the patients (general practitioners [GPs]).ractic
hat yo
ther 
O
G
k you
his/he
 and y
ctice 
 and y
as prspectively. Tests for equal parameters [44] were applied. Results
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a
518 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 1 4 – 5 2 3are not reported in the “Results” section, but briefly touched upon
in the “Discussion” section.
Assuming that the error terms in Equation (1) are independent
and identically distributed (iid) extreme value random vari-
ables, a canditional logit (CL) model can be specified (the IIA
assumption has been tested and shown to hold in the unforced
choice models for both GPs and patients.)
Pij
eXij
j1J eXij
(2)
where  is the scale parameter that is inversely related to the error
variance. The scale parameter entails that attribute weights in
DCEs are not directly comparable, and instead it is possible to
measure the relative impact of the attributes by calculating the
MRS given that a linear additive function is appropriate. In the CL
model, the error variances are assumed to be constant across in-
dividuals. To allow heterogeneity in the scale parameter, a het-
eroscedastic conditional logit (HCL) model can be used, in which
the variance of unobserved factors is allowed to vary over individ-
uals [43]. In the HCL model, the source of variance can be tested;
that is, it is possible to test whether error variances differ across
GPs and patients. The HCL model was also used to test for equal
parameters by using the log-likelihood test of parameter equal-
ity [44]. Models were estimated in Stata 10 by using the clogit
and clogithet commands (the Stata command clogithet is writ-
ten by Hole [46]).
Results
Descriptive statistics
The representativeness of the samples was tested on the variables
age, gender, and geography (distribution of respondents in the five
regions of Denmark). Results from the patient questionnaire
showed that respondents aged 18 to 29 years were overrepre-
sented in the sample (P  0.001), while there were fewer respon-
dents represented in the sample in the age groups 40 to 49, 60 to 69,
and 89 years (P  0.001). The sample was representative with
respect to gender and geography. The sample of GPs was repre-
Table 2 – Estimation results for the full model, patients, GP
error).
Full model Patie
Parameters
Telephone 0.036 (0.002)* 0.032 (0
Opening hours 0.117 (0.024)* 0.014 (0
Appointment 0.064 (0.004)* 0.071 (0
Distance 0.046 (0.002)* 0.054 (0
Waiting room 0.012 (0.003)* 0.001 (0
Consultation time 0.032 (0.003)* 0.023 (0
Routine tasks 0.001 (0.022) 0.001 (0
ASC A 0.146 (0.030)* 0.135 (0
Heteroskedasticity
Scale (GPs  1)
LL(0) 4444 1935
LL(model) 3608 1524
Pseudo R2 0.188 0
n (observations) 12824 5584
N (respondents) 1667 698
LR test Equal utility
ASC, alternative specific constant; GPs, general practitioners; LL, log-
* Explanatory power at a 0.01 significance level.
† Explanatory power at a 0.05 significance level.sentative with respect to gender, geography, and age except forthe age group 70 years, which was slightly underrepresented in
the sample (P  0.014). The random allocation of GPs and patients
across DCE blocks was successful because no statistically signifi-
cant differences in respondent compositions across blocks were
detected (with respect to age, gender, and geography). Essential
patient and GP characteristics are reported in Table A1 in the Ap-
pendix (available at Supplemental Materials found at doi: 10.1016/
.jval.2012.01.002) together with attitudinal answers to questions
bout the organization of general practice.
Research question 1: do GPs know patients’ preferences
when status quo is not an option?
Four logit models based on forced choice data are presented in
Table 2. The full model includes observations from both patients
and GPs, while the next two models provide estimates for the
groups separately. The fourth model is an HCL model, in which
scale is allowed to differ between patients and GPs. The goodness-
of-fit statistics show that all four models have reasonably good
model fits with pseudo R2 around 0.2 [47]. For the patient model,
the statistically significant attributes have the expected signs, and
three attributes (opening hours, waiting room, and routine tasks)
are seen to be statistically insignificant, indicating that choice of
GP is not generally influenced by these attributes. For the GP sam-
ple, only one attribute is statistically insignificant, that is, routine
tasks. The other attributes are statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level with the expected signs, except for the attribute
opening hours, which has a negative sign. The likelihood ratio test
of equal parameters across the two groups rejects that parameters
are equal. Furthermore, it is seen that GPs’ preferences are char-
acterized by a significantly lower scale, that is, higher variance
(assuming equal utility parameters).
Table 3 presents MRS estimates (with the distance attribute as
denominator) and rank orders (derived from the CL model). From
the table it is evident that the MRS for the attributes telephone,
opening hours, waiting room, and consultation time are statisti-
cally significantly different between GPs and patients. Further-
more, the rank orders of the attributes are very different for the
two groups. Looking at the sizes of MRS estimates it is seen that
the waiting time for the appointment is valued equally across the
d a heteroscedastic full model for forced choice (standard
GPs Heteroscedastic model
* 0.039 (0.003)* 0.038 (0.003)*
0.175 (0.028)* 0.118 (0.024)*
* 0.060 (0.006)* 0.069 (0.005)*
* 0.040 (0.003)* 0.050 (0.003)*
0.021 (0.003)* 0.013 (0.003)*
* 0.039 (0.003)* 0.034 (0.003)*
0.031 (0.030) 0.001 (0.024)
* 0.159 (0.040)* 0.157 (0.032)*
0.123 (0.068)†
2509 4444
2028 3605
0.192 0.189
7240 12824
969 1667
meters – df  9 (critical 0.95
2 ): 106.036 (16.919)
hood; LR, likelihood-ratio.s, an
nts
.003)
.038)
.007)
.003)
.004)
.004)
.037)
.046)
.212
para
likelitwo groups (although rank order differs), whereas MRS for opening
519V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 1 4 – 5 2 3hours is very different for the two groups. Also, waiting time in the
waiting room is ranked as lowest for each group, but MRS esti-
mates differ significantly. All other possible combinations of MRS
estimates were also explored with continuous attributes as de-
nominators, and more differences were found in the MRS esti-
mates between GPs and patients. More specifically, it was found
that the following MRS estimates differed: Opening hours/Tele-
phone, Distance/Telephone, Waiting room/Telephone, Opening
hours/Appointment, Waiting room/Appointment, Consultation
time/Appointment, Appointment/Consultation time, and Dis-
tance/Consultation time.
The choice behaviors of GPs and patients in the forced choice
are shown in Table 4 in which it can be seen that choice behavior
is statistically significantly different between GPs and patients on
more than half of the 16 choice sets.
Research question 2: do GPs know the preferences and
loyalty of the patients when they have the option of staying
with their current GP?
In Table 5 the four logit models related to the unforced choice are
presented. The goodness-of-fit statistics show that all four models
are very good at predicting preferences with pseudo R2 above 0.5.
In both the patient and GP models, the attributes have the ex-
pected signs. The attribute routine tasks is statistically insignif-
icant in both models, while the attribute waiting time in the
Table 3 – MRS, confidence intervals, and rank order of attri
Attribute Patie
MRS* 95% CI
Telephone (min) 0.592 0.733 to 
Opening hours (open on Saturdays  1) 0.521 3.310 to 2.
Appointment (d) 1.314 1.585 to 
Distance (km) — —
Waiting room (min) 0.020 0.179 to 0.
Consultation time (min) 0.432 0.314–0.5
Routine tasks (nurse  1) 0.039 2.622 to 2.
CI, confidence interval; GPs, general practitioners; MRS, marginal rat
* MRS was multiplied two for effect-coded attributes.
Table 4 – Choice behavior of patients and GPs and a compa
Patients
GP A GP B
Choice set 1 30.85 69.15
Choice set 2 86.07 13.93
Choice set 3 75.62 24.38
Choice set 4 17.41 82.59
Choice set 5 74.07 25.93
Choice set 6 68.25 31.75
Choice set 7 78.31 21.69
Choice set 8 61.90 38.10
Choice set 9 15.05 84.95
Choice set 10 35.92 64.08
Choice set 11 26.21 73.79
Choice set 12 32.04 67.96
Choice set 13 97.06 2.94
Choice set 14 30.39 69.61
Choice set 15 85.29 14.71
Choice set 16 25.49 74.51GPs, general practitioners.waiting room is statistically insignificant only in the patient
model. The likelihood ratio test of equal parameters across the
two groups rejects that parameters are equal in the case of an
unforced choice. Furthermore, GPs are seen to have a statisti-
cally significantly higher scale, that is, lower variance (assum-
ing equal utility parameters) than are patients in the unforced
choice model.
Looking at the MRS and rank orders in Table 6, it is seen that
MRS for the attributes telephone and waiting room are statistically
significantly different and that MRS for all attributes are generally
higher for the GPs than for the patients. However, rank orders are
similar except for the attribute distance, which is ranked differ-
ently across the two groups. GPs underestimate the importance of
distance to patients. When looking at all possible combinations of
MRS estimates with continuous attributes as denominators, it was
found that in addition to the differences in MRS shown in the
table, MRS estimates also differed for Distance/Telephone and
Distance/Consultation time.
The choice behaviors of the GPs and patients in the unforced
choice are shown in Table 7, in which it is seen that there are
differences in choice of GP in most choice sets. Generally, GPs
overestimate the frequency with which patients choose their cur-
rent practice except for choice set 15 where choice behavior is
similar in the two groups and choice set 7 where patients’ choice of
current practice is underestimated.
s for patients and GPs in forced choice.
GPs
Rank order MRS* 95% CI Rank order
3 0.983 1.192 to 0.774 6
4 8.820 11.942 to 5.698 1
1 1.508 1.849 to 1.168 3
2 — — 4
7 0.520 0.681 to 0.359 7
5 0.992 0.846–1.139 5
6 4.005 1.336 to 4.473 2
substitution.
n using chi-squared statistics in forced choice (%).
GPs Chi-squared
statistic (P)
GP A GP B
34.45 65.55 0.64 (0.422)
92.08 7.92 4.15 (0.042)
68.53 31.47 2.67 (0.102)
18.88 81.12 0.16 (0.692)
71.62 28.38 0.32 (0.574)
54.11 45.89 8.70 (0.003)
56.00 44.00 22.84 (0.000)
36.82 63.18 25.62 (0.000)
18.06 81.94 0.71 (0.400)
27.43 72.57 3.60 (0.058)
60.71 39.29 51.79 (0.000)
47.93 52.07 11.10 (0.001)
98.67 1.33 1.01 (0.316)
9.95 90.05 21.25 (0.000)
94.52 5.48 7.69 (0.006)
46.01 53.99 12.17 (0.000)bute
nts
0.450
269
1.043
138
51
699
es ofriso
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The present study investigated whether GPs know the preferences
of patients at an aggregate level with respect to a number of orga-
nizational characteristics in general practice. This was tested by
using a dual-response DCE in which parameter equality, MRS,
rank orders, and choice behavior across choice sets were exam-
ined for GPs and patients in both the forced choice and the
unforced choice. It was found that GPs have a clearer under-
standing of patient preferences in the unforced choice DCE be-
cause GPs correctly predict the rank orders of the attributes
(except for distance) although they do not adequately realize
the need to compete to keep present patients on their list. In the
forced choice DCE, our results suggest that GPs are not aware of
which attributes are of importance in patients’ choice of a new
GP.
In the forced choice DCE, the test for equal utility parameters
was rejected, and MRS and rank orders were seen to differ on most
attributes. In the unforced choice DCE, preferences were also seen
to differ although the rank order was the same for GPs and pa-
tients except for the distance attribute, which was underesti-
mated by the GPs. An important result was that GPs tend to over-
Table 5 – Estimation results for the full model, patients, GP
(standard error).
Full model Patie
Parameters
Telephone 0.040 (0.004)* 0.024 (
Opening hours 0.232 (0.047)* 0.197 (
Appointment 0.105 (0.012)* 0.087 (
Distance 0.046 (0.005)* 0.051 (
Waiting room 0.017 (0.005)* 0.009 (
Consultation time 0.038 (0.004)* 0.022 (
Routine tasks 0.036 (0.042) 0.055 (
ASC A 1.473 (0.151)* 1.194 (
ASC B 1.681 (0.141)* 1.433 (
Heteroskedasticity
Scale (GPs  1)
LL(0) 7112 3067
LL(model) 2748 1431
Pseudo R2 0.614 0
n (observations) 19422 8376
N (respondents) 1667 698
LR test Equal utility
ASC, alternative specific constant; GPs, general practitioners; LL, log-
* Explanatory power at a 0.01 significance level.
Table 6 – MRS, confidence intervals, and rank order of attri
Attribute Patients
MRS* 95% CI
Telephone (min) 0.466 0.686 to 0.246
Opening hours (open on
Saturdays  1)
7.807 3.257–12.358
Appointment (d) 1.721 2.444 to 0.997
Distance (km) — —
Waiting room (min) 0.183 0.441 to 0.075
Consultation time (min) 0.427 0.217 to 0.638
Routine tasks (nurse  1) 2.168 2.149 to 6.486
CI, confidence interval; GPs, general practitioners; MRS, marginal rat
* MRS was multiplied by two for effect-coded attributes.estimate patients’ inclination to choose their current GP. Although
patients are prone to choosing their current GP when they have
the opportunity to do so (patients chose current GP in 84% of
choices), GPs indicate themselves as patients’ preferred choice in
90% of cases. This tendency is reflected in the higher negative
coefficients on the alternative specific constants A and B in the GP
model in Table 5. The result suggests that GPs are not fully aware
of the need to compete on the features of their GP practice to keep
patients on their list. Although GPs underestimate the necessity
of competition, they do seem to know which attributes patients
perceive as important when choosing among their present GP
and a new GP.
That GPs are not fully aware of patients’ preferences is in line
with the findings of Marshall et al. [13] and Mühlbacher and
Nübling [14], who also found divergence between patients’ prefer-
ences and health-care providers’ perceptions of patients’ prefer-
ences. In addition, Marshall et al. [13] found that GPs overesti-
mated the frequency with which patients chose the opt-out
option. This is also in line with our findings. Contrarily, Neuman
and Neuman [15] found that physicians’ perceptions of prefer-
ences were close to the preferences of patients with multiple my-
eloma.
d a heteroscedastic full model for unforced choice
GPs Heteroscedastic model
)* 0.075 (0.008)* 0.038 (0.004)*
)* 0.364 (0.078)* 0.220 (0.041)*
)* 0.136 (0.017)* 0.095 (0.009)*
)* 0.039 (0.007)* 0.039 (0.004)*
) 0.038 (0.008)* 0.017 (0.004)*
)* 0.068 (0.007)* 0.036 (0.003)*
) 0.075 (0.067) 0.040 (0.037)
)* 1.593 (0.223)* 1.211 (0.135)*
)* 1.797 (0.215) 1.395 (0.131)*
0.278 (0.040)*
4045 7112
1252 2709
0.691 0.619
11046 19422
969 1667
meters – df  10 (critical 095
2 ): 52.177 (18.307)
hood; LR, likelihood-ratio.
s for patients and GPs in unforced choice.
GPs
nk order MRS* 95% CI Rank order
5 1.890 2.614 to 1.165 4
1 18.473 10.705–26.241 1
3 3.440 5.071 to 1.810 3
4 — — 6
7 0.956 1.453 to 0.459 7
6 1.718 1.048–2.387 5
2 3.826 3.222 to 10.873 2
substitution.s, an
nts
0.005
0.062
0.014
0.006
0.007
0.005
0.055
0.212
0.206
.534
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There are limitations to this study. Both groups of respondents are
not representative with respect to age compared with their respec-
tive populations (although GPs are only slightly underrepresented
for respondents aged 70 years). This means that to the extent age
influences preferences for the characteristics included, results are
not fully generalizable to the Danish population. We tested
whether age was a significant explanatory factor in our analyses
by including the over- and underrepresented age groups as inter-
action variables in the CL models for forced and unforced choices.
Results showed that all interaction variables were insignificant
except for the interaction variable waiting time on the telephone x
patients aged 60 to 69 years (P  0.029) in the forced choice. This
esult indicates that patients in this age group have more disutility
rom waiting on the phone than do the rest of the respondents.
ased on the overall findings, it is argued that the lack of repre-
entativity on age does not influence our results markedly, indi-
ating that results to a great extent are generalizable to the Danish
opulation.
It must be acknowledged that there are several potential
ources of bias such as nonresponse bias, self-selection bias, and
vidity. Survey mode bias may also be a problem, particularly for
he sample obtained from using an online survey. In the Danish
etting, this problem is thought to be reduced because a significant
roportion of the Danish population has Internet access in their
omes.
Also, the design of the survey can affect results, and in partic-
lar the choices of levels have been shown to have an impact on
licited preference structures, for example, [48–51]. In the present
tudy, the utmost has been done to apply appropriate and policy-
elevant attribute levels. For example, waiting times were re-
orded during observational stays in randomly chosen general
ractices where it was found that an appropriate upper limit for
aiting time was 30 minutes. Generally, level ranges were chosen
n the basis of examination of results from other studies investi-
ating patients’ preferences for the organization of general prac-
ice, interviews with patients, visits to general practices, inter-
iews with GPs, and discussions with the Organisation of General
ractitioners in Denmark. The MRS and the relative differences in
P and patient preferences observed in this study should, how-
ver, not be extrapolated beyond the attribute levels applied.
The criteria for the selection of attributes were chosen to en-
Table 7 – Choice behavior of patients and GPs and a compa
Patients
GP A GP B Status quo
Choice set 1 4.98 6.97 88.06
Choice set 2 22.89 4.98 72.14
Choice set 3 6.97 2.99 90.05
Choice set 4 1.49 9.95 88.56
Choice set 5 5.82 3.17 91.01
Choice set 6 16.93 4.23 78.84
Choice set 7 20.63 4.23 75.13
Choice set 8 7.94 4.76 87.30
Choice set 9 3.40 11.65 84.95
Choice set 10 8.25 14.08 77.67
Choice set 11 2.43 9.71 87.86
Choice set 12 3.88 10.68 85.44
Choice set 13 19.61 0.00 80.39
Choice set 14 7.84 7.84 84.31
Choice set 15 10.78 1.96 87.25
Choice set 16 0.98 9.80 89.22
GPs, general practitioners.ure operable and policy-relevant results that could inform GPsand policy makers on how practical improvements of the agency
relationship could be made. It would also be of interest, however,
to look at other attributes that might influence patients’ choice of
GP such as age and gender of the GP, the GP’s reputation, recom-
mendations from family and friends, and mutual understanding
between the GP and the patient. Previous research exists on these
topics (see, e.g., [52,53]). When designing the present survey, the
attributes included were deemed the best to pursue the objectives
of this article. Clearly, the attributes included in this survey are
just one of several possible combinations, and it is thus not nec-
essarily a superior set of attributes. More research on preferences
for other attributes related to patients’ choice of GP is warranted.
Possible explanations for nonalignment of preferences
Our results show that when patients are forced to choose a new
GP, they consider only some organizational attributes, that is,
waiting time on the telephone, waiting time to the appointment,
distance, and consultation time, while GPs think that all attributes
(except for routine tasks) are important in the choice of a new GP.
We tested whether the larger GP sample size affected our results
by performing the analyses with a random subsample of 698 GPs.
This did not change the significance of the attributes.
An explanation for the differences in expressed patient prefer-
ences across the two respondent groups may be that GPs have
responded strategically to the discrete choice questions and
stated their own preferences instead of the patients’ preferences.
That GPs in the forced choice DCE believe that patients derive
negative utility from extended opening hours strongly suggests
that this may be the case. This raises the question of whether GPs
are capable of acting as agents for the patients in real life when
they are not capable of doing so when explicitly asked to in an
exercise. Future research should explore this further. To verify
whether some GPs are more aware of patients’ preferences, we
performed subgroup analyses (data not reported). When rerun-
ning the aforementioned regressions including only young GPs,
GPs who recently established themselves in general practice, or
GPs who believe that patients should be involved in decision mak-
ing, the overall results remained the same.
Divergence in preferences in the forced choice may be partly
due to the rather hypothetical situation the GPs are put in because
they are asked to imagine that they have to close their practice and
n using chi-squared statistics in unforced choice (%).
GPs Chi-squared
statistic (P)
GP A GP B Status quo
2.05 0.00 97.95 20.95 (0.000)
13.11 0.82 86.07 15.74 (0.000)
2.94 1.27 95.78 5.60 (0.061)
1.69 3.80 94.51 6.67 (0.036)
0.42 1.26 98.33 13.43 (0.001)
8.05 1.27 90.68 12.18 (0.002)
16.88 12.12 71.00 8.58 (0.014)
0.87 6.96 92.17 13.88 (0.001)
0.88 6.19 92.92 7.68 (0.021)
0.44 9.21 90.35 20.22 (0.000)
0.89 2.67 96.44 11.26 (0.004)
7.24 3.17 89.59 11.21 (0.004)
11.95 0.00 88.05 3.36 (0.087)
3.59 11.66 84.75 3.55 (0.169)
15.60 0.92 83.49 1.87 (0.393)
0.46 7.37 92.17 0.87 (0.648)risothat their patients have to choose a new GP. The higher variances
522 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 1 4 – 5 2 3observed in the regression analyses based on GPs’ responses to
forced choices support this hypothesis. In the unforced choice,
GPs have lower variance than the patients, suggesting that they
are more certain of their answers (which for the majority of re-
sponses is the status quo option). That rank orders are similar for
all attributes except for distance in the unforced choice also sug-
gests that GPs have greater difficulties predicting the more hypo-
thetical aspects in choice of GP. The distance attribute must be
deemed the most hypothetical attribute from the GPs’ point of
view, because it is an attribute that is more difficult to influence
than the other attributes.
In the unforced choice, divergence in preferences may also be
explained by differences in GPs’ and patients’ reported status quo
characteristics (see Table A1 in the Appendix [Respondent Char-
acteristics] in Supplemental Materials found at doi: 10.1016/j.
jval.2012.01.002). For example, it is seen that compared with the
GPs, patients report longer waiting times on the telephone and in
the waiting room and shorter consultations. The dispersion in sta-
tus quo characteristics entails that the status quo option will ap-
pear more attractive to the GPs than to the patients. This may
explain why GPs choose the status quo option more often than the
patients. The differences in reported status quo characteristics
can be due to real differences or due to differences in perceptions
of reality (or a mixture). Geographically, GPs and patients are rep-
resentative of their respective populations, and the GPs included
in the sample serve more than 25% of the Danish population. It is
therefore most likely that the differences in status quo character-
istics across samples are attributable to differences in perceptions
of reality. An additional explanation may be that by providing the
patients with information on GP characteristics, which they usu-
ally do not possess, the market becomes more transparent and
transaction costs decrease. This may prompt patients to choose a
new GP more often than is normally experienced by the GPs. The
discrepancy in GPs’ perceptions of patient preferences and pa-
tients’ expressed preferences for the status quo may therefore be
driven by the fact that GPs’ responses are based on experiences of
patients’ behavior in a less informed setting whereas patients’
expressed preferences are steered by the increased level of infor-
mation on practice characteristics. Clearly, more research on this
topic is warranted to better understand the underlying mecha-
nisms.
Why such a large proportion of respondents chose status quo
in the unforced choices cannot be verified. We could be dealing
with true preferences for the current GP. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by the fact that there is a general satisfaction with current
GPs (89% of the patients stated that they were satisfied with their
GP). However, the high proportion may also be caused by the use of
the dual-response approach. In a study of Dhar and Simonson [54],
it was found that respondents were more likely to choose the sta-
tus quo alternative when respondents were first presented with a
forced choice. Contrarily, Brazell et al. [27] found no systematic
biases in the applications of dual-response approaches. Future
studies should add to the knowledge on how the dual-response
approach affects preferences.
Finally, the lack of congruence between GPs’ and patients’
choices may be explained by the fact that GPs are likely to make
choices on the basis of their perceptions of the preferences of
those patients who are regular visitors in the clinic. Frequent vis-
itors are unlikely to be representative of the full sample of patients
on the GP lists, and hence GPs may have a biased view of patient
preferences. To test for potential bias, the analyses were rerun
including only those patients who had visited their GP within the
last year or patients who had visited their GP more than two times
within the last year. Seemingly, our results are robust, because the
preferences among these selected patient groups and the GPs’ per-
ceptions of patient preferences remain different. It should be
noted that although we do observe nonalignments in patients’preferences and GPs’ perceptions of these preferences at the ag-
gregate level, this does not preclude that alignments may be pres-
ent to some extent at the individual practice level. In the current
analyses it was not possible to link patients to their specific GP. It
was possible, however, to test for alignment of preferences on a
regional level (although sample sizes become very low). It was
found that GPs in Region Zealand and the North Denmark Region
had utility parameters equal to those of the patients in both forced
and unforced choices. GPs in The Capital Region of Denmark had
utility parameters equal to those of the patients in the unforced
choice, while GPs in the Region of Southern Denmark and in the
Central Denmark Region had different utility parameters com-
pared with those of the patients. This indicates that there may be
alignment of preferences on a more disaggregated level. However,
the results could be influenced by very small sample sizes. Future
analysis should test whether alignment of preferences is in-
creased if patient and GP data are matched.
Conclusions
Overall, our conclusion that GPs are not fully aware of patient
preferences at an aggregate level appears to hold. Even though GPs
almost succeeded in predicting the rank order of preferences in
the unforced choice, there is still room for improving the agency
relationship in the organization of general practice. The underly-
ing reason for nonalignment of preferences may be a lack of in-
centives among GPs for investing time and effort into establishing
such knowledge. Lack of knowledge of patient preferences is more
likely to occur in markets in which market powers are put aside
because of third-party regulations and/or in countries in which the
need to compete for patients is reduced because of shortage of
GPs, as is the case in Denmark. Lack of competition on the market
for general practice services renders the exercise of eliciting the
public’s preferences for these services even more imminent.
When market forces cannot ensure optimal resource allocations
and proper prioritization of important aspects of health-care ser-
vices, it is of great value that policy makers and planners are aware
of the preferences of the general public.
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